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ANNUAL SURVEY
OF WASHINGTON LAW
REVIEWABILITY OF ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
ACTIONS OF LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD
In June 1962, plaintiff applied to the State Liquor Control Board for
change of location of his tavern license. Plaintiff proposed to move his
tavern business around the corner and across the street from its former
location. The Board investigated the proposed move, and, after care-
ful consideration, notified the plaintiff of the Board's approval.' In
reliance on this notice of approval, plaintiff spent his life's savings
acquiring, remodeling, and equipping the new location. Thereafter,
without a formal hearing, the Board informed the plaintiff that ap-
proval of the proposed move had been withdrawn.2 The plaintiff
sought a writ of mandamus directed to the Board to compel effectua-
tion of the change of location, or to show cause why it should not do
so. The trial court concluded that, according to applicable statutory
provisions, it did not have jurisdiction to review actions of the Board.
On appeal, a divided court reversed.' Held: If the action of the Wash-
ington State Liquor Control Board in revoking prior approval of a
change in license location is arbitrary and capricious, the superior
'The Board sent the plaintiff the following notice:
After careful consideration the Board has approved your application for change
of location from 3210 West McGraw Street to 2410 32nd West. This approval is
subject to arranging the new premises as per sketch submitted, and proper
equipping of the same.
Please notify this office or your inspector when these new premises are ready
for occupancy, in order that the necessary reinspection may be made.
66 Wash. Dec. 2d 126, 128, 401 P.2d 635, 636 (1965).
2 On Oct. 19, 1962, the Board wrote the plaintiff that they had received substantial
objections to the relocation of the tavern, and that the commitment previously given
by the Board was to be held in abeyance until further notice. At the instigation of
the Board, a meeting of approximately 22 protestants was held Dec. 12, 1962, at the
Board's offices in Seattle. The plaintiff and his supporters were neither invited to,
nor informed of, the meeting. Id. at 129, 401 P.2d at 637.
'Chief Justice Rosellini wrote the opinion for the majority, which was concurred
in by Judges Finley, Ott, Hunter, Hamilton, and Hale. Judge Weaver wrote the dis-
senting opinion, and was joined by the Judges Hill and Donworth. The dissenting
opinion reasoned that the sole question to be determined was whether the superior
court had jurisdiction to review the Board's actions, and concluded that there was no
jurisdiction. The dissent stated that the legislative policy against review was clear, and
that the majority opinion had the effect of declaring the prohibitory statute unconstitu-
tional without having the issue properly presented. In addition, the dissent concluded
that the Administrative Procedure Act did not apply because the case was a "pending
proceeding" when the amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act, removing the
exclusion of the Board from its coverage, became effective.
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court has jurisdiction to review and set aside the decision. State ex rel.
Shannon v. Sponburgh, 66 Wash. Dec. 2d 126, 401 P.2d 635 (1965).
The Washington court has held that the manner and extent of regu-
lation of the sale of alcoholic beverages rests in the legislative judg-
ment of the state and is a matter of legislative policy.4 It has been the
declared legislative policy of Washington that control and sale of
alcoholic beverages is governed solely under the police power of the
state.5 The Washington court has ruled that the police power of the
state is plenary in regard to intoxicating liquor.6 The Washington
legislature has vested administration of the state liquor laws in the
Liquor Control Board' and has stated that the Board may, in its dis-
cretion, grant or refuse any application for a license," and may, in its
discretion and with or without a hearing, suspend or cancel any
license.' The legislature has further declared that the decisions of the
Board are final and not subject to judicial review." As originally
enacted, the Administrative Procedures Act" specifically stated that
its provisions did not apply to the Liquor Control Board. 2 In 1963,
the APA was amended to remove the exclusion of the Board. The
APA provides that acts inconsistent with its provisions are repealed,
but such repeals are not to affect pending proceedings.' Since the
principal case arose from incidents occurring in 1962, it was probably
a "pending proceeding" within the statutory language. 4 Thus, the
court in the principal case was faced with a conflict between statutory
provisions and case law that denied jurisdiction on the one hand, and
considerations of equity and justice that supported judicial review on
the other.
Ajax v. Gregory, 177 Wash. 465, 32 P.2d 560 (1934).
5 WASH. REV. CODE § 66.08.010 (1961).
'Derby Club v. Becket, 41 Wn. 2d 869, 873, 252 P.2d 259, 260 (1953).7 WASH. REv. CODE § 66.08.020 (1961).
8 WASH. REV. CODE § 6624.010(2) (1961).
'WASH. REv. CODE § 66.24.010(3) (1961).
" WASH. Rv. CODE § 66.08.150 (1961), provides:
Save as in this title otherwise provided the action, order or decision of the
board as to any permit or license shall be final and shall not be reviewed or
restrained by injunction, prohibition or other process or proceeding in any
court or be removed by certiorari or otherwise into any court.
n WASH. REv. CODE ch. 34.04 (1959) (hereinafter cited as APA).
" Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 234 § 15, at 1088.
" WASH. REv. CODE § 34.04.910 (1959).
' It is arguable that the "pending proceedings" provision refers to proceedings
before passage of the APA, and that the 1963 amendment should be applied retro-
actively. The Washington court has stated that "a statute is remedial and has a
retroactive application when it relates to practice, procedure, or remedies, and does
not affect a substantive or vested right." Tellier v. Edwards, 56 Wn. 2d 652, 653,
354 P.2d 925, 926 (1960).
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In the principal case, the court reviewed the statutory powers of
the Board and acknowledged the apparent exclusionary provision
regarding judicial review. The court considered the 1963 amendment
to the APA to be indicative of a changing legislative policy, giving
recognition to the efficacy of judicial review in a proper case. The
court stated, however, that it need not rest its decision on the applica-
bility of the amendment. The court noted that it had previously held
that it possessed constitutional power to review acts of public officials
which are alleged to be arbitrary and capricious, and that this power
cannot be abridged by the legislature.lD The court reasoned that it
would be difficult to imagine an act of an administrative agency more
arbitrary and capricious than the act of the Board in reversing its
prior decision after it had been relied upon, without a justifiable legal
basis of illegality, irregularity, or fraud." The court stated that the
doctrine of equitable estoppel is properly applicable in such a case to
prevent grave injustice.
The court's decision, finding jurisdiction in the superior court to
review the Board's action if arbitrary and capricious, was a significant
change in the scope of judicial review of administrative agencies.
Prior to the decision in the principal case, there had not been an
instance of judicial review of the Liquor Control Board's actions. 17
The statute prohibiting judicial review of the Board's actions is quite
specific,' and its constitutionality was not challenged by the plaintiff. 9
Though the court did not declare the statutory prohibition unconstitu-
tional, the practical effect of the decision may be very close to denying
validity.2 The court concluded that it had a constitutional power to
review acts of public officials which are alleged to be arbitrary and
"o State ex rel. Cosmopolis Consol. School Dist. v. Bruno, 59 Wn. 2d 366, 367 P.2d
995 (1962), 38 WASH. L. REv. 249 (1963).
o In People ex rel. Finnegan v. McBride, 226 N.Y. 252, 123 N.E. 374 (1919), the
court stated that corrections in administrative decisions may be made when the
determination resulted from "illegality," "irregularity," or "fraud." The court in
the principal case noted the rule in McBride, and stated that no claim of "illegality,"
"irregularity," or "fraud" was made in the principal case. 66 Wash. Dec. 2d at 133,
401 P.2d at 639.
' In State ex. rel. Stone v. Wright, No. 29468, an application for writ of cer-
tiorari to review the trial court's refusal to entertain a review of the Board's cancel-
lation of a liquor license was denied without opinion.
t WASH. REV. CODE § 66.08.150 (1961).
The constitutional question was presented in an amicus curiae brief. How-
ever, in the opinion of the dissenting justices, since the issue was not presented to
the trial court, it could not be considered on appeal. 66 Wash. Dec. 2d at 135 n.1,
401 P.2d at 641 n.1. However, the constitutionality of the Liquor Act was upheld
in Ajax v. Gregory, 177 Wash. 465, 32 P.2d 560 (1934).
'Judge Weaver, in his dissent, concludes that the effect of the majority opinion
is to hold the statute unconstitutional. 66 Wash. Dec. 2d at 136, 401 P.2d at 641.
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capricious, and that this power cannot be abridged by the legislature,
citing State ex rel. Cosmopolis Consol. School Dist. v. Bruno21 as
authority.
Cosmopolis is not the best authority, as there was a considerable
factual difference between it and the principal case. In Cosmopolis, the
legislature had made no provision regarding judicial review of the
agency's actions; however, the court stated that specific statutory
authority to review the agency's action was not necessary, because the
right to review was guaranteed by article 4, sections 1 and 6 of the
state constitution. In the principal case, the court adopted the lan-
guage in Cosmopolis and extended the rule to a case involving a specific
statutory prohibiton of review. Thus, the court in the principal case
said, in effect, that the absolute prohibition of judicial review is uncon-
stitutional as being a restriction on the constitutionally delegated
power of review given to the courts. Had the issue of constitutionality
been properly raised in the principal case, it is possible that the court
would have directly declared the statute invalid.22
Though Cosmopolis is not strong authority for the decision in the
principal case, there is greater support for judicial review in the prin-
cipal case than in Cosmopolis. In Cosmopolis, the action reviewed was
not determined to be judicial in nature.23 However, licensing has an
obvious quasi-judicial character when it involves determination of
qualifications of, and satisfaction of requirements by, an individual
applicant.
Regardless of the Washington precedent, the decision of the court
in the principal case to allow review was sound. A limited judicial
review strengthens the administrative process. 4 A complete disregard
of the courts may violate the "cardinal principle" that functions should
be allocated between courts and agencies on the basis of the compara-
tive qualifications of each.235 A review which is limited to areas of
2159 Wn. 2d 366, 367 P.2d 995 (1962). It is interesting to note that the writer of
the majority opinion in the principal case, Chief Justice Rosellini, dissented in
Comnopolis.
--'Possibly the decision in the principal case is well described by a statement
from the United States Supreme Court in Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States,
216 U.S. 177, 195 (1910):
[T]he courts have rarely, if ever, felt themselves so restrained by technical
rules that they could not find some remedy, consistent with the law, for acts,
whether done by government or by individual persons, that violated natural
justice or were hostile to the fundamental principles devised for the protection
of essential rights of property.
' See 38 WAsH. L. REv. 249 (1963).
"44 DAvis, ADMismTATrVE LAW 112 (1958). See Peck, The Scope of Judicial
Review of Administrative Actions in Washington, 33 WAsH. L. REy. 55 (1958).
4 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 24, at 113.
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judicial expertise, such as determination of constitutional issues and
limits of fair procedure, can be only helpful in accomplishing adminis-
trative objectives. 23 Certain types of decisions, such as whether liquor
should be sold, at what times, and on what days, are legislative-type
decisions, and, being of general applicability, are best left to resolution
by the legislature or the Board. However, the question whether a
particular individual is entitled to sell liquor in a particular location
is more a judicial-type decision. In regard to the latter, the courts
can effectively perform their historic function in ensuring that general
judicial and equitable principles are properly applied to specific cases.
The check upon administrative authority is desirable for the same
reasons that an appellate court's check on a trial court is desirable."
The importance of this "checking" function is especially significant
when there is little administrative check on initial action. Carrying
the absolute statutory prohibition of review to its logical extreme would
prevent judicial review of even the most flagrant and arbitrary actions.
Such a result conflicts with traditional concepts of justice and fairness.
As one commentator has stated:
This view that those who engage in the alcoholic beverage trade have
no claim to procedural fairness is, of course, supported by decisions hold-
ing that the business is one with such potential evil consequences that it
is subject to regulation without limitation of procedural due process
[citing cases]. On the other hand, the vesting of autocratic and author-
itarian control in any governmental agency must give pause to one
committed to the proposition that judicial review plays an important
part in maintaining our democracy.2
In addition, the possibility of high profits and the danger of strict
governmental limitations create a fertile breeding ground for the temp-
tation of graft, corruption, and other abuses of governmental office.2"
The public has a right to expect its officers to observe prescribed
standards and to make adjudication on the basis of merit, and judicial
review can aid the realization of this expectation.
It may be valuable to speculate on the applicablilty of the APA pro-
visions to the Board in a factual situation similar to the principal case
arising after the 1963 amendment became effective. The only logical
-' Ibid.
Ibid.
Peck, Washington Legislation, 1957, Administrative Law, 32 WAsH. L. REv.
181, 182 n.4. See generally, JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADmimsTRATvE ACTION
18-20 (1965).
Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 609 (5th Cir. 1964).
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interpretation to be given to the enactment of the amendment, remov-
ing the exclusion of the Board, is that the legislature intended to in-
clude the Board within the provisions of the APA. The APA does
not specifically overrule any of the liquor laws; however, the act does
state that all inconsistent provisions of other acts are repealed. In
addition, it appears that the intent of the legislature in originally
enacting the APA was to assign to the administrative agencies and to
the courts those functions for which each was best suited. The courts
were given the task of serving as a check on the constitutionality and
procedural fairness of administrative actions.30 The obvious conclu-
sion is that the legislature sought to provide judicial review of the
Board's actions.
Despite the legislative intent, the provisions of the APA relating to
procedure in contested cases, and governing judicial review of the
decisions in contested cases, probably do not apply to the Liquor Con-
trol Board.31 These provisions only apply to contested cases, and a
"contested case" is defined by the APA as "a proceeding before an
agency in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties
are required by law or constitutional right to be determined after an
agency hearing."32 The actions of the Board, of the type in the prin-
cipal case, do not come within this definition, since the licensee's priv-
ilege of transferring his liquor license to a new location3" is not required
by law34 or constitutional right33 to be determined after an agency
hearing."
See WASH. REv. CODE § 34.04.130 (1959).
3 tHowever, the provisions of the APA governing rule-making presently apply
to the Board. The intent of the legislature was to remove the exclusion of the Board
from the Act's provisions, and in the rule-making provisions there is no qualifying
requirement that may continue to exclude the Board from the Act's requirements as
there is in regard to the judicial review provisions. The Board has acted in pur-
suance of the APA rule-making requirements. See WASHINGTON STATE LIQUOR
CONTROL BOARD, REVISED RULES AND REGULATIONS (1964).
"
2WASH. REv. CODE § 34.04.010 (1959).
'Written consent must be obtained from the Board before a license may be trans-
ferred to a new location, WASHINGTON STATE LIQUOR CONTROL BOAI, REVISED RULES
AND REGULATIONS, tit. 1 § 10 (1964), which consent is subject to the discretion of
the Board. WASH. REv. CODE § 66.24.010(2), (3) (1961).
4 On the contrary, the provisions of the liquor laws were amended in 1935 to
remove the requirement that the Board's discretion be exercised only after a hearing.
Wash. Sess. Laws 1935, ch. 174, § 3, at 610.
See Randles v. Washington State Liquor Control Bd., 33 Wn. 2d 688, 694, 206
P.2d 1209, 1213 (1949).
"'Though it appears that these provisions of the APA do not presently apply to
the Board, the Board may consider itself bound by this part of the Act. In the
WASHINGTON STATE LIQuoR CONTROL BOARD REVIsED RULES AND REGULATIONS tit.
14 § .08.080 (1964), provision is made for a hearing in contested cases. The new
detailed hearing provisions seem to indicate that the Board may consider at least
some of its decisions to be contested cases.
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The Washington court could, and there is considerable support for
the argument that it should, give effect to the legislative intent by
stating that there is a constitutional right to a hearing in liquor license
cases. Previously, the court has held that there is no constitutional or
natural "right" to sell liquor, and that the "privilege" of dispensing
liquor may be given to some and denied to othersY Based on the
conclusion that the sale of liquor is a "privilege," state law has denied
procedural fairness in liquor license cases.38 However, this approach
has been severely criticized. As Professor Davis states:
[N] o court explains why procedural fairness should be denied to those
whose business can be constitutionally prohibited. The courts often seem
tacitly to reason that because sale of liquor may be prohibited, therefore
an individual seller of liquor may be unfairly treated. Such reasoning is
palpably fallacious. If selling liquor is unlawful, the state does not license
it; no procedural unfairness is involved in general legislation making the
sale of liquor unlawful. But if the state or other governmental unit has
issued a license to the seller then the business is lawful, and a seller who
has made his investment and developed his business should be entitled
to fair treatment.39
Whether characterized as a right or privilege, if the interest in-
volved is important, it should be protected." It is clear that a liquor
license is important; witness the substantial investments made in res-
taurants, the financial success of which depends largely upon their
having a liquor license. Further, the privilege-right distinction is no
longer generally accepted as determinative of whether due process does
or does not control administrative action.4' One who has no "right"
to sell liquor because the state may prohibit the sale altogether, may
nevertheless have a "right" to fair treatment when state officers grant,
deny, suspend, or revoke liquor licenses.42  This concept has been
adopted by other states.43
Though the Washington court may not declare that there is a con-
' The court designated liquor licenses as "privileges" rather than "property" in
Arndt v. Manville, 53 Wn. 2d 305, 333 P.2d 667 (1958); Randles v. Washington
State Liquor Control Bd., 33 Wn. 2d 688,206 P.2d 1209 (1949).
See WASH. REv. CODE §§ 66.24.010(3), 66.08.150 (1961).
c' 1 DAvis, ADmiNIsTATIVE LAW 498 (1958).
"In Ledgering v. State, 63 Wn. 2d 94, 103, 385 P2d 522, 528 (1963), the court
stated that, "inhering in possession of a motor vehicle operator's license, whether
such be denominated a privilege or a right, was an interest of sufficient value that
due process of law required a full hearing at some stage of a deprivation proceeding."
" See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 n.5 (1957) ; Weiman
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1952).
"1 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 39, at 456.




stitutional right to a hearing, it is quite probable that there is such a
federal constitutional right. In Hornsby v. Allen,44 a federal court of
appeals stated that denial of an application for a liquor license was
not a legislative act, but rather licensing was an adjudicative process.
The court in Hornsby reasoned that, since licensing consists of deter-
mination of factual issues and the application of legal criteria to them
-a judicial act-the fundamental requirements of due process are
applicable. As indicated by the court in Hornsby, due process in
administrative proceedings requires conformity to fair practices of
Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence,45 which is usually equated with adequate
notice and a fair hearing.46 The court in Hornsby concluded that,
although strict adherence to the common law rules of evidence at the
hearing is not required," the parties must generally be allowed an
opportunity to know the claims of the opposing party, to present evi-
dence to support their contentions,4 and to cross-examine witnesses
for the other side.4 9 Responding to the argument that, since Georgia
had classified liquor licenses as privileges, the licensing authority has
an unreviewable discretion to grant or deny licenses, the court in
Hornsby stated that merely calling a liquor license a privilege did not
free the authorities from due process requirements in licensing and
allow them to exercise an uncontrolled discretion. According to
Hornsby, denial of procedural due process in licensing is a violation
of the applicant's fourteenth amendment rights. Consequently, it is
possible to argue that there is a constitutional right to a hearing in
Washington liquor license cases, and thus all of the provisions of the
APA should apply to the Liquor Control Board.
There is a third method of fully including the Board's activities
within the APA. Since it seems logical that the legislative intent in
passing the 1963 amendment was to include the Liquor Control Board
within the APA, it is reasonable to expect additional legislation pro-
viding unambiguous applicability. The defect in the present form of
the APA could be easily remedied through a change in the definition
of "contested case" to include license cases, or through the enactment
of a statutory requirement for hearings in liquor license cases, thus
bringing the Board's licensing actions within the present definition of
"326 F2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964).
" See Tadano v. Manney, 160 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 1947).
See Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941).
See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
Reilly v. Pinkers, 338 U.S. 269 (1949).
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a "contested case." Since the two former methods would require the
bringing of a suit to determine whether the APA applies to the Board,
doubt can best be resolved by the legislature acting to bring the actions
of the Liquor Control Board unambiguously within the provisions of
the APA.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CIVIL INSPECTION WITHOUT
WARRANT OR PROBABLE CAUSE
The Seattle Municipal Code requires intermittent inspections by
the fire chief of nonresidential buildings for the purpose of discovering
and correcting fire hazards.' Pursuant to the Code, an inspector, with-
out a search warrant and without cause to believe that a fire hazard
existed, sought entry into defendant's locked warehouse. Upon his
refusal to allow entrance, defendant was tried and convicted for failing
to submit to a fire inspection.2 On appeal, the conviction was affirmed.
Held: The fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable search
and seizure is not violated by a conviction for refusal to permit
entrance into a commercial building for purposes of a fire inspection
authorized by a municipal ordinance, even though the inspector does
not have a search warrant or probable cause to believe that a fire haz-
ard exists. City of Seattle v. See, 67 Wash. Dec. 2d 465, 408 P.2d 262
(1965).
The adage that prevention is better than cure has prompted munici-
palities to employ building inspections to detect and minimize hazards
created by increased urbanization. That such a practice may raise
fourth amendment questions concerning rights of privacy is well illus-
trated by the United States Supreme Court's divided attitude toward
the status of these inspections.' The principal case represents the
first consideration in Washington of this conflict between public de-
'SEATLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CoDE § 8.01.050 (1959).
2SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 8.01.050 (1959) provides that the fire chief
may enter all buildings, other than residences, for the purpose of inspections. Sec-
tion 8.01.140 provides that anyone who fails to comply with any provision of the fire
code shall be subject to certain criminal penalties. While no provision expressly
requires a building owner to permit an inspector's entry, the case proceeded on that
assumption. For a contrary ruling on this question, see City of St. Louis v. Evans,
337 S.W.2d 948 (Mo. 1960).
'Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), was a 5-4 decision, while Ohio ex rel.
Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246 (1959), was affirmed by an equally divided court. It has
been frequently suggested that personnel changes on the Court would result in con-
trary decisions if those cases were now presented. See, e.g., Comment, 11 VILL. L.
REV. 357, 368-69 (1966).
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